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Abstract
This paper shows that, in a R&D-based growth model in which
vertical and horizontal innovations occur simultaneously, increasing
the capital income tax leads to faster growth. For this result to hold,
the production function for both vertical and horizontal innovations
must have constant returns to scale.
Keywords: Endogenous growth, Capital income tax, Vertical in-
novation, Horizontal Innovation, Scale eect.
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1 Introduction
The eects of capital income taxation on economic growth is an important
topic for not only economists but also policymakers. A substantial body
of literature concludes that taxing capital income is bad for growth [see,
e.g., Judd (1985); Chamley (1986); Lucas (1990); Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
(1993); and Peretto (2003)]. However, some studies cast doubt on this view.
For example, Uhilg and Yanagawa (1996), de Hek (2006), and Chen and
Lu (2013) show that higher capital income taxes may lead to faster growth.
Conesa, Kitao, and Kruger (2009) and Hiraguchi and Shibata (2015) have
emphasized that the optimal tax rate on capital is positive. Whether a
government should tax capital income remains an open question.
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The present paper contributes to the literature on supporting positive
capital income taxation in an endogenous growth model. The analysis is
closely related to the analyses in Young (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson
(1998), and Peretto (2003), who developed R&D-based growth models with
vertical and horizontal innovations. In fact, the model in the present paper is
the same as that of Peretto (2003), apart from vertical innovation technology.
Peretto considers that the production function for vertical innovation has
decreasing returns to scale and shows that an increase in the tax rate on
capital income induces a decline in the long-run growth rate. The present
analysis shows that the linear production function leads to an opposite result;
i.e., an increase in capital income tax has a positive eect on the growth rate.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the model. Section 3 considers the market equilibrium dynamics
and derives the main result.
2 The Model
The model draws on work by Peretto (2003). It allows individuals to allocate
time to labor supply and leisure, and consists of two types of innovation
sector: vertical innovation and horizontal innovation. A government taxes
consumption and labor, capital, and corporate incomes to provide public
goods and lump-sum transfers.
2.1 Consumption and Labor Supply
I consider the closed economy populated by identical individuals who supply
labor services and consumption loans in competitive labor and assets mar-
kets. The population at time t is represented as Lt = L0e
t, where L0 is the
initial population and  is the rate of population growth. The lifetime utility
is
Ut =
Z 1
t
e ( )( t) log ud;  >   0; (1)
where  is the individual discount rate. Instantaneous utility at time t is
log ut = logCt +  log(1  lt) +  logGt; ;  > 0; (2)
where Ct is a consumption index, lt is the faction of time allocated to labor
supply [so that (1  lt) is leisure], and Gt represents public goods supplied by
the government. Constant parameters,  and , are the elasticity of instan-
taneous utility with respect to leisure and public goods, respectively. The
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consumption index is symmetric over a continuum of dierentiated goods,
Ct =
Z Nt
0
(cit)
(" 1)=" di
"=(" 1)
; " > 1; (3)
where " is the elasticity of dierentiated product substitution, cit is the de-
mand for each dierentiated good, and Nt is the number of goods (rms).
Individuals face the ow budget constraint
_At = [rt(1  tA)  ]At + (1  tL)Wtlt   (1 + tE)Et + Tt: (4)
All variables are in per capita terms. At is nancial wealth, rt is the rate of
return on capital, Wt is the wage rate, and Et is consumption expenditure.
The wage rate is the numeraire, W  1. The government taxes labor income
at rate tL, capital income at rate tA, and consumption at rate tE, and pays
lump-sum transfers Tt.
Individuals maximize (1) subject to equations (2){(4). The optimal con-
dition for the problem is obtained as follows.
_Et
Et
= rt(1  tA)   (5)
Ltlt = Lt

1  1 + tE
1  tL Et

(6)
Equation (5) is a Euler equation, and equation (6) is the aggregate labor
supply.
Furthermore, at each time, individuals decide how they consume each
dierentiated good to maximize (3), given the expenditure Et. Solving the
well-known static problem yields the aggregate consumption of good i,
Xit = Ltcit = LtEt
P "itR Nt
0
P 1 "jt dj
; (7)
where Pit is good i's price.
2.2 Production
The rm with a patent supplies its dierentiated good exclusively with the
technology
Xit = Z

it(LXit   ); 0 <  < 1;  > 0; (8)
where Xit is output, LXit is labor employment, and  is a xed management
cost. Zit is labor productivity, which is a function of the rm's accumulated
stock of innovations, Zit, with elasticity .
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2.3 Vertical Innovation: Corporate R&D
The rm can increase its productivity by innovation, which occurs according
to
_Zit = KtLZit ;  > 0; (9)
where _Zit is the ow of innovations generated by employing LZit units of
labor in R&D for an interval of time dt, and K is the productivity of
labor in R&D, as determined by the exogenous parameter  and the stock
of public knowledge, Kt = Zt  1Nt
R Nt
0
Zitdi. The level of public knowledge
is determined by the average productivity among each rm; thus, (9) is
rewritten as
_Zit = ZtLZit : (10)
The function is linear with respect to labor. However, Peretto (2003) assumes
the decreasing returns to scale function. This change generates the opposite
eect of capital income tax on the growth rate, as discussed later.
The present discounted value of after-tax prot for the rm that has a
patent on the dierentiated good i is
Vit =
Z 1
t
e 
R 
t rsds(1  t)id;
where t is the tax rate on prot, and pre-tax prot is it = PitXit  LXit  
LZit .
At any time, t, the rm chooses price to maximize the pre-tax prot
subject to the demand (7), the technology (8), and the given Zit. The optimal
price for good i is
Pit =
"
"  1Z
 
it : (11)
Given the price, the demand for each good i is obtained as follows:
Xit =
"  1
"
Z"itR Nt
0
Z
(" 1)
jt dj
Et:
Substituting these into pre-tax prot yields the maximized prot
it =
Z
(" 1)
itR Nt
0
Z
(" 1)
jt dj
EtLt
"
    LZit :
Before proceeding to the dynamic problem, I impose the following two
assumptions for analytical simplicity.
Assumption 1. Previous corporate R&D generates an external eect that
causes present R&D productivity to increase.
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All rms choose their R&D strategies without recognizing that present R&D
has a positive spillover to future R&D technology. The next assumption
guarantees that the second order condition of the R&D decision problem
discussed below is satised.
Assumption 2. ("  1) < 1.
Each rm chooses R&D strategies to maximize the present discounted
value of after-tax prot, into which the maximized prot is substituted, sub-
ject to the innovation technology (10) and rival rms' strategies.
Since R&D follows constant returns to scale technology, the equilibrium
condition for nite R&D to occur is
qit =
1  t
Zt
; (12)
where qit is the co-state variable, which is the marginal value of productivity
Zit. Equation (12) implies that the marginal value is equal to its marginal
cost. An optimal R&D level is not yet determined. As discussed below, it is
determined by such as no arbitrage condition in the capital market.
The return to innovation must satisfy the following.
rt = (1  t)("  1) Z
(" 1) 1
itR Nt
0
Z
(" 1)
jt dj
EtLt
"qit
+
_qit
qit
: (13)
The transversality condition is lim!1 e 
R 
t sdsqiZi = 0.
2.4 Horizontal Innovation: Entrepreneurial R&D
The main objective of entrepreneurial R&D is the creation of new goods.
Entrepreneurs can create new goods and enter the industry by using only
labor inputs .
_Nt = LNt;  > 0; (14)
where  is the productivity of labor in entry, and LNt is the amount of
employment required to create _Nt new rms for an interval of time dt. The
productivity of entrepreneurs is equal to the average productivity among
incumbent rms, 1
Nt
R Nt
0
Zjtdj, and incumbent rms are symmetric. This
implies that entrant rms are also symmetric with respect to productivity.
Therefore, the values for new rms are always the same as those for symmetric
incumbent rms.
Entrepreneurs may enter freely into variety-expanding R&D. They nance
the product development costs by issuing equity. The after-tax prot for
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entrepreneurs is (1  t)R&Dt dt = (1  t)(VtdNt  WtLNtdt). Imposing the
free entry condition on this implies
Vt =
1

, LNt > 0: (15)
Entry is positive if the value of the rm is equal to its start-up cost. The
prot that accrues to an entrepreneur is given by the expression derived for
incumbents. Thus, the market value of a rm's shares satises the arbitrage
condition: rt = (1  t)itVt +
_Vt
Vt
. Note that the second term in the right-hand
side is always zero, because Vt is constant over time. Imposing symmetry on
the pre-tax prot for production rm i, I obtain the following:
t = it = jt =
EtLt
"Nt
    LZt ; for all j 6= i: (16)
Substituting this and (15) into the arbitrage condition yields the rate of
return on entrepreneurial R&D
rt = (1  t)

EtLt
"Nt
    LZt

: (17)
2.5 The Government
The government taxes consumption, labor income, capital income, and cor-
porate prot. These tax rates are constant over time. The government
produces public goods, hiring labor at Wt  1. The production function is
Gt = LGt , where LGt is public employment at time t. The government can-
not borrow and allocates fraction g of tax revenues to the provision of public
goods and fraction 1  g to lump-sum transfers to individuals. This satises
the budget constraint: tLLt+ t
R Nt
0
itdi+ tEEtLt+ tArtAtLt = LGt +TtLt.
2.6 The Labor Market
There are four sources of labor demand. First, the production sector em-
ploys
R Nt
0
LXitdi units of labor to produce dierentiated goods. Second, in
the corporate R&D sector,
R Nt
0
LZitdi units of labor are employed. Third,
employment in the entrepreneurial R&D sector is LNt. Fourth, LGt units
of labor are employed to provide public goods. Equating units of labor
to the aggregate labor supply Lt gives the labor market clearing condition:
Lt =
R Nt
0
(LXit + LZit)di+ LNt + LGt .
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3 The Market Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Equilibrium Values and Dynamic Equations
The assumption that rm's productivity Zit is symmetric causes price Pit
and output Xit to be symmetric. That is, for all i, Pt = Pit =
"
" 1Z
 
t , and
Xt = Xit =
" 1
"
EtLt
Nt
Zt . Substituting the latter into (8) yields
LXt =
"  1
"
EtLt
Nt
+ : (18)
In what follows, I focus on an internal equilibrium, where both corporate
and entrepreneurial R&D occur.1 In this situation, equalization of the returns
to vertical innovation and horizontal innovation is required. In the capital
market, this is called no arbitrage condition. Since, under the homogeneous
productivity Zt, equation (13) can be rewritten as
rt = ("  1)EtLt
"Nt
  LZt ; (19)
no arbitrage condition is as follows.


("  1)EtLt
"Nt
  LZt

= (1  t)

EtLt
"Nt
    LZt

: (20)
This equation holds at all moments in time and characterizes equilibrium.
Before proceeding to analysis of economic dynamics, I impose the fol-
lowing assumption. It guarantees the stability of an internal equilibrium, in
which two kinds of R&D are implemented.
Assumption 3. ("  1) > (1  t).
Under Assumptions 1{3, the level of corporate R&D is determined so that
equation (20) can be satised all times. Solving (20) for LZt in the corporate
R&D sector yields
LZt =
("  1)  (1  t)
  (1  t)
EtLt
"Nt
+
(1  t)
  (1  t): (21)
The interest rate is simultaneously determined,
rt =
(1  t)
  (1  t)

[1  ("  1)]EtLt
"Nt
  

: (22)
1In the present model, since R&D functions (9) and (14) are linear functions of labor
input, it is possible that one of the two R&Ds is not implemented. In other words, a corner
solution may occur. For the aim of this paper, however, the internal solution is assumed.
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These are illustrated as the following gure.2
Eq.(17)
Eq.(19)
rt
LZt
rt
LZt
Figure 1: Equilibrium on vertical and horizontal R&D
The after-tax rate of return to investment is indeed the rate of return to
saving since, in this economy, the only nancial asset available to individuals
is ownership shares of rms (stocks). In particular, the capital market clears
when AtLt = NtVt. Using this condition, the arbitrage condition, rt =
(1  t)tVt , and equation (16), one can rewrite public employment as
LGt = g

tLLt + [t + tA(1  t)]

EtLt
"Nt
    LZt

Nt + tEEtLt

: (23)
The market equilibrium dynamics can be described by the Euler equation
and the growth rate of the number of goods per capita, nt  NtLt . Using (22),
the Euler equation can be written as
_Et
Et
=
(1  tA)(1  t)
  (1  t)

[1  ("  1)] Et
"nt
  

  :
The labor market clearing condition in the symmetric situation reads Lt =
Nt(LXt +LZt) +LNt +LGt . Using (14), (18), and (23), this can be rewritten
_nt
nt
= 

1
nt
  1
  (1  t)

[(1 + )("  1)  "(1  t)] Et
"nt
+ 

  LGt

 :
As shown below this system has a unique steady state that can be shown to
be saddle stable under Assumptions 2 and 3.
2If Assumption 2 is not satised, the interest rate is always negative.
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3.2 Steady State Analysis
Set _Et = 0 to obtain
Et =
"
1  ("  1)

  (1  t)
(1  tA)(1  t)+ 

nt; (24)
and set _nt = 0 to obtain
Et =   [  (1  t)]"
(1 + )("  1)  "(1  t)



+ LGt +

  (1  t)

nt   1

:
(25)
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the slope of the _Et = 0 line is positive, and that
of the _nt = 0 line is negative and its intercept is positive.
The intersection in (nt; Et) space of equations (24) and (25) determines
the steady state values of consumption expenditure and the number of goods
per capita, as illustrated in Figure 2. The steady state values are represented
as n and E.
nt
Et
E
∗
n
∗
E˙t = 0
n˙t = 0
Figure 2: The Phase Diagram on Et and nt
Figure 2 states that, in the case where the initial number of goods per capita,
n0, is relative low, specically n0 < n
, the number of goods per capita,
nt, and the consumption expenditure, Et, both increase toward the steady
state. In addition, one can conrm that the ratio Et
nt
gradually decreases.
The amount of the input into corporate R&D, LZt , decreases as the economy
approaches the steady state.
9
The growth rate of productivity, LZ , and the interest rate, r
, in the long-
run are determined to equalize the rate of returns on two kinds of R&D.3
LZ =
("  1)  (1  t)
  (1  t)
E
"n
+
(1  t)
  (1  t) (26)
r =
(1  t)
  (1  t)

[1  ("  1)] E

"n
  

(27)
The steady state rate of return, r, is dependent on the consumption expen-
diture per good, E

n . On the balanced growth path, however, consumption
expenditure, Et, is constant
4 and, hence, r is determined to satisfy the con-
dition that the after-tax interest rate is equal to the discount rate:
(1  tA)r = : (28)
From this condition, one can conrm that the vales of E

n and L

Z are de-
termined irrespective of the labor market equilibrium. This means that the
growth rate of productivity is independent of the population Lt and, specif-
ically, that there is no scale eect in the present model.5
These three equations (26){(28) yield the following important result of
this paper.
Proposition 1. Capital income tax has a positive eect on the growth rate
of productivity, LZ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition of the proposition is as follows. The introduction of and/or
increase in capital income tax leads to a higher rate of return on R&D [see
equation (28)]. The higher rate of return stimulates the consumption ex-
penditure per good [see equation (27)], which increases the growth rate of
productivity [see equation (26)]. By contrast, in Peretto (2003), a rise in
the consumption expenditure per good is relatively low, with the result that
rms must reduce the number of employees for the higher rate of return to
hold. This leads to a decline in the productivity growth.
Eects of other scal variables on the productivity growth are the same
as those obtained in Peretto (2003). Corporate income tax has a positive
3In the present model, the growth rate of productivity is given as
_Zt
Zt
= LZt , which de-
pends on the labor employment in corporate R&D. Thus, one can express the productivity
growth as LZt .
4See the Euler equation (5).
5The labor market equilibrium is achieved by the adjustment of the number of rms
per capita, n.
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eect on productivity growth, but labor income and consumption taxes have
no eect.6
The growth rate of an individual's utility is derived as follows.7
_ut
ut
= 
_Zt
Zt
+

1
"  1 + 

:
One can conrm that the growth rate of an individual's utility is independent
of the population scale and increases as capital income taxes increase.
6See Appendix C for the proof of this.
7See Appendix D for a detailed derivation.
11
References
[1] Chamley, C. (1986), "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General
Equilibrium with Innite Lives," Econometrica, 54, 607-622.
[2] Chen, B. -L. and Lu, C. -H. (2013), "Optimal Factor Tax Incidence
in Two-sector Human Capital-based Models," Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 97, 75-94.
[3] Conesa, J. C., Kitao, S., and Krueger, D. (2009), "Taxing Capital? Not
a Bad Idea After All!," American Economic Review, 99, 25-48.
[4] De Hek, P. A. (2006), "On Taxation in a Two-sector Endogenous Growth
Model with Endogenous Labor Supply," Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 30, 655-685.
[5] Dinopoulos, E. and Thompson, P. (1998), "Schumpeterian Growth with-
out Scale Eects," Journal of Economic Growth, 3, 313-335.
[6] Hiraguchi, R. and Shibata, A. (2015), "Taxing Capital is a Good Idea:
The Role of Idiosyncratic Risk in an OLG Model," Journal of Economic
Dynamics, and Control, 52, 258-269.
[7] Jones, L. E., Manuelli, R. E., and Rossi, P. E. (1993), "Optimal Taxation
in Models of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, 101,
485-517.
[8] Judd, K. L. (1985), "Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Fore-
sight Model," Journal of Public Economics, 28, 59-83.
[9] Peretto, P, F. (2003), "Fiscal Policy and Long-run Growth in R&D-
based Models with Endogenous Market Structure," Journal of Economic
Growth, 8, 325-347.
[10] Uhlig, H. and Yanagawa, N. (1996), "Increasing the Capital Income Tax
may Lead to Faster Growth," European Economic Review, 40, 1521-
1540.
[11] Young, A. (1998), "Growth without Scale Eects," Journal of Political
Economy, 106, 41-63.
12
Appendix
A Sign of (1 + )("  1)  "(1  t)
In this section, it is conrmed that the expression (1+)(" 1) "(1  t)
is positive. This expression can be rewritten as follows.
(1 + )("  1)  "(1  t)
= (1 + )("  1)  (1  t) + (1  t)   "(1  t)
= ("  1)  (1  t) + ("  1)  ("  1)(1  t)
= ("  1)  (1  t) + ("  1)[  (1  t)]
The sum of the rst two terms is positive, due to Assumption 3, and the
expression in square brackets of third term is also positive under Assumptions
2 and 3. Therefore, (1 + )("  1)  "(1  t) is positive.
B Proof of Proposition 1
I investigate how capital income tax aects the growth rate of productivity,
LZ . The interest rate in the steady state can be written as
r =

1  tA :
Dierentiating this with respect to tA yields
@r
@tA
=

(1  tA)2 > 0:
Thus, capital income tax increases the rate of return on R&D. The interest
rate aects the consumption expenditure per good, E

n . To investigate this
eect, I rearrange equation (27) as follows.
E
n
=
"
1  ("  1)

  (1  t)
(1  t) r
 + 

: (29)
Dierentiating this with respect to r yields
d (E=n)
dr
=
"
1  ("  1)

  (1  t)
(1  t)

> 0:
This implies that the consumption expenditure per good is increasing along
with the interest rate. Dierentiating equation (26) with respect to E

n , one
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can easily conrm that the growth rate of productivity, LZ , is an increasing
function of the consumption expenditure per good.
dLZ
d (E=n)
=
("  1)  (1  t)
  (1  t)
1
"
> 0:
Therefore, the capital income tax has a positive eect on the growth rate of
productivity, (dLZ=dtA) > 0.
C Eects of Corporate Income, Labor Income,
and Consumption Taxes
Firstly, I investigate how corporate income tax aects the growth rate of
productivity, LZ . There are two eects of the tax on L

Z : a direct eect and
an indirect eect. The indirect eect is through a change in the consumption
expenditure per good. Since this tax has no eect on the interest rate, I
dierentiate (29) with respect to t, which yields
d (E=n)
dt
=
"
1  ("  1)
2
f(1  t)g2 r
 > 0:
Thus, corporate income tax increases the consumption expenditure per good.
Considering the indirect eect, I dierentiate (26) with respect to t.
@LZ
@t
=

f  (1  t)g2

f1  ("  1)g E

"n
  

+
("  1)  (1  t)
f  (1  t)g"
@ (E=n)
@t
> 0:
Therefore, the corporate income tax has a positive eect on the growth rate
of productivity.
Secondly, it is clear that labor income tax and consumption tax have no
eect on the growth rate of productivity, LZ , because equations (26){(28)
are independent of these tax parameters.
D Derivation of the Growth Rate of an Indi-
vidual's Utility
In the symmetric case, the equilibrium consumption index can be written as
follows.
Ct =
Z Nt
0
(ct)
(" 1)="di
"=(" 1)
=

Nt(ct)
(" 1)=""=(" 1) = N "=(" 1)t ct;
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where ct = cit = cjt, for all j 6= i. Using the aggregate consumption of each
dierentiated good, obtained in equation (7), and the production function,
(8), one can rearrange this expression:
Ct =
N
"=(" 1)
t
Lt
Xt =
N
"=(" 1)
t
Lt
Zt (LXt   ):
In the steady state, the labor employment in the production sector is constant
and, thus,
Ct =
N
"=(" 1)
t
Lt
Zt (L

X   ): (30)
Substituting (18) into this, I obtain
Ct =
N
"=(" 1)
t
Lt
Zt

"  1
"
E
n
+   

=
N
"=(" 1)
t
Lt
Zt

"  1
"

E
n
:
Dierentiating this with respect to t yields
_Ct =
N
"=(" 1)
t
Lt
Zt

"  1
"

E
n
"
"
"  1
_Nt
Nt
 
_Lt
Lt
+ 
_Zt
Zt
#
: (31)
The growth rate of the consumption index is, therefore,
_Ct
Ct
=
"
"  1
_Nt
Nt
 
_Lt
Lt
+ 
_Zt
Zt
:
Now, I consider the relationship between the growth rates of Nt and Lt.
The denition of the number of rms per capita is nt  NtLt . Dierentiating
this with respect to t yields
_nt
nt
=
_Nt
Nt
 
_Lt
Lt
:
In the steady state, _nt is zero, which means that the growth rate of the
number of goods is equal to that of the population,
_Nt
Nt
=
_Lt
Lt
= . Hence,
_Ct
Ct
= 
_Zt
Zt
+
1
"  1; (32)
where the growth rate of productivity is
_Zt
Zt
= LZ = 

("  1)  (1  t)
  (1  t)
E
"n
+
(1  t)
  (1  t)

: (33)
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I derive the growth rate of an individual's utility. The instantaneous
utility function is dened as
log ut = logCt +  log(1  lt) +  logGt; ;  > 0:
Firstly, Ct is the consumption index; its long-run growth rate is calculated
in equation (32). Secondly, the fraction of time allocated to labor supply is
represented as lt; its optimal value is obtained in equation (6). The time-
dependent variable for this is only the consumption expenditure, Et. This
variable converges to E in the long-run, which implies that lt is constant in
the long-run,
l = 1  1 + tE
1  tL E
:
Thus, the growth rate of the fraction of time allocated to labor supply is
zero. Thirdly, Gt represents public goods supplied by the government. The
production function is Gt = LGt . The steady state value of LGt is
LGt = g

tLLt + [t + tA(1  t)]

E
"n
    LZ

nLt + tEELt

:
The growth rate of public goods is, therefore,
_Gt
Gt
=
_LGt
LGt
=
g _Lt

tL + [t + tA(1  t)]
 
E
"n     LZ

n + tEE
	
gLt

tL + [t + tA(1  t)]
 
E
"n     LZ

n + tEE
	
= :
Combining these results yields the growth rate of an individual's utility.
_ut
ut
=
_Ct
Ct
+ 
_Gt
Gt
= 
_Zt
Zt
+

1
"  1 + 

:
This is not aected by the population scale but is endogenously determined
by parameters such as preference and scal variables.
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